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ON THE CLASSIFICATION OF RECENT CYCLICAL EXPERIENCE
JOHN R. MEYER AND DANIEL H. WEiNBERG
In recent National Bureau research fresh assess-
ments have been attempted of some age-old
questions concerning the classification and de-
scription of market economy business cycles.'
Two important changes in the empirical facts
of cyclical behavior have largely motivated these
reassessments. The first is the seeming emer-
gence of a systematic biasinpublic policy
toward achieving lower unemployment at the
expense of somewhat greater and more per-
sistent price inflation. The second is that de-
clinesinabsolute measures of output have
become increasingly rare in the market econ-
omies of Europe, Japan, and North America—
though we may well wish to revise this judgment
if current difficulties persist much longer!
Perhaps the most formal recognition of this
new awareness about cyclical phenomena is
the definition of so-called growth cycles,in
which a declining rate of growth, rather than an
absolute decline, defines an economic retarda-
lion or recession. Similarly, an increasing em-
phasis is placed on real rather than monetary
measures of cyclical performance. It has been
This introduction is adapted from a paper, "On the Use-
fulness of Cyclical Taxonomy," presented by the authors
on June 25, 1975 at the 12th annual CIRET meeting in
Stockholm, Sweden.
1. use Mintz, "U.S. Growth Cycles," Explorations in
Economic Research, Vol.I,No.1, summer 1974. John
Meyer and Daniel Weinberg, 'On the Classification of Eco-
nomic Fluctuations," Explorations in Economic Research,
Vol. II, No. 2, spring 1975. The discussion in the opening
paragraphs of this report draws heavily on the findings
reported in depth in that article.
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found, for example, that the leading indicators,
first developed at the National Bureau and now
maintained by the Department of Commerce,
are for many purposes more useful when mea-
sured in deflated than in original values.2
As an approach to the classification of cyclical
phenomena, both the shift in emphasis to the
use of real rather than money measures and the
development of the growth cycle concept must
be deemed significant adaptations and, in all
probability, improvements in the state of the art.
Their utility, however, may be compromised by
new departures in economic policy and cyclical
behaviOr. As we have argued in previous Na-
tional Bureau annual reports,3 it seems safe to
assert that, at a minimum, it is less than fully
edifying under modern business cycle condi-
tions to adhere to a two-phase scheme that dif-
ferentiates only between recessions (as defined,
say, by traditional National Bureau procedures)
and periods of nonrecession. The remarkably
"unconventional" character of recent experi -
ence would seem to lend nothing butcredence
to that view.
Specifically, we suggested that a four-phase
classification scheme might.suit modern cyclical
circumstances rather better than a two-phase
2. The Commerce Department has recently adopted a
new leading indicators index that emphasizes deflated
values. See monthly Business Conditions Digest, Depart-
ment of Commerce, for details.
3. John R. Meyer, "The New Realities of the Business
Cycle,"NationalBureau of Economic Research,Inc.,
53rd Annual Report, September 1973.scheme.4Indeed,a"four-stage taxonomy"
would seem implicit in much of current fore-
casting and popular discussions of the business
cycle. These four cyclical stages might be de-
fined to a first approximation (and in expected
sequence) as follows:
1. Recession—a period of some duration in
which total aggregate activity declines some-
what from previous peak levels and is widely
diffused throughout the economy.
2. Recovery—the early expansion out of a
recession during which prices are relatively
stable, total output is expanding, and produc.-
tivity gains are pronounced.
3. Demand-pull inflation—a period during
which production is at capacity constraints but
effective demand is even greater, thus resulting
in rising prices and declining productivity.
4. Stagf/ation—a situation of stagnation or
very slow growth àta relatively high level of
activity mixed with price inflation.
To test this four-stage scheme (and, in addi-
tion, to test the general adequacy of a more
"mechanized" approach to cyclical classifica-
tion) we applied multivariate discriminant anal-
ysis to time series data on the performance of
the United States economy, starting with Feb-
ruary 1947. These dates not only correspond
roughly to the emergence of the new policy
orientation, but also to when good quarterly
and monthly data on aggregate economic per-
formance in the United States first became avail-
able. By a cêmbination of prior knowledge of
the cyclical history of the post-World War II
period in the United States and application of
the discriminant analysis, we arrived at a classi-
fication of the peiod from February 1947 through
September 1973 (the last date on which we had
data for our original analysis) into a four-phase
4. Of course, in advancing a four-phase scheme it could
be said that we were echoing very traditional concepts,
built around sinusoidal alterations derived from physical
analogs. However, our four-phase scheme was rather more
behavioral—and certainly less regular or periodic—than
that suggested by a sine curve. Two inflection points and
two turning points, unless augmented by behavioral ex-
planations and hypotheses, do not necessarily connote
much about economic conduct. In pursuing a four-phase
behavioral description of the cycle, we could be said to be
resurrecting early concepts advanced by Wesley Mitchell.
See Wesley C. Mitchell, Business Cycles: The Problem
and Its Setting (New York: National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1927).
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scheme (see Table I-i).
The only major instance in which the four-way
specification seemed to fail totally was in the
years 1958 through 1960, although even this re-
sult was not totaUy unanticipated since there was
much discussion during that period about the
abortive character of the 1958—1959 recovery.
In addition, we found that the period from 1953
to 1958 could be defined as either a four-stage
cycle, in which the fourth, or stagflation, phase
was extremely abbreviated, or as a three-stage
cycle in which the stagflation stage was totally
eliminated. We would stress, moreover, in keep-
ing with the hypothesis that modern business
cycles may be as much a product of conscious
policy decisions asof"automatic"market
forces, that we do not suggest the "inevitability"
of these four phases. They could occur or not
occur depending on the policy choices made.
Accordingly, we did not consider the absence
of a clear-cut stagflation phase in some postwar
cycles as necessarily a major failing.
The average values for the variables used in
carrying out the classification scheme for the
four cyclical stages, as defined in Table I-i, are
shown in Table 1-2. These averages more or less
conformed with our (and, we believe, most
other) prior expectations about the differences
in the different cyclical stages. There remains,
though, the usual question of whether our re-
sults are a curious and unique artifact of the par-
ticular sample that we used. That is, would we
find a similar classification sensible and mean-
ingful for other economies or other time periods?
A particularly interesting exercise, obviously,
would be to extrapolate beyond our original
sample period, ending in September 1973, into
the stormy and highly unique cyclical experi-
ences of 1974 and early 1975.
The discriminant analysis, for example, can
be used to make cyclical classifications for the
months of late 1973 on through 1974 and into
the first quarter of 1975 (the most recent period
for which data are available at the time of this
writing). This exercise, of course, also provides
an extrapolative test of the generality of our
analytical scheme. The results from such a for-
ward extrapolation (giving those months after
September 1973 a diffuse or null prior, i.e., an
equal prior probability of occurrence of eachTABLE I-i
Classification of U.S. Business Cycles into a Four-Stage Scheme
February 1947 through September1973
Starting Dates
Recession Recovery Demand-Pull Stagflation
? ?
December 1948 November 1949 July 1950
November 1953 August 1954 March 1955
September1957 May 1958 —









Average Value of Variables for Four Cyclical Stagesa since WorldWar II
Demand- stag-
Variables Recession Recovery Pull flation
Average, Avail-
All Periodsabilityb
Money GNPC —0.79 8.43 8.48 6.46
Real GNP (1958 dollars)<' —2.69 6.56 4.07 3.29
6.66 0
3.79 0
Govt. surplus (+) or deficit (—.) as
percentofGNP —1.14 —0.64 1.47 0.17 0.05 0
Gross govt. expenditures C 6.35 5.32 10.22 14.40 8.74 0
GNPpricedeflatorc 1.82 1.89 4.41 3.20
Consumerpriceindexe 1.37 1.47 4.49 3.71
Food onlyc 0.99 0.98 6.30 3.12
All commodities other than food C —0.34 1.03 3.64 2.80
Wholesale price indexe —0.93 1.43 6.08 1.39







N.Y. Stock Exchange composite
price indexd 0.20 1.15 0.19 0.07 0.51 M
Compensation per manhourc 2.38 5.12 6.25 7.47
Outputpermanhourc 1.57 4.68 2.41 2.36




Prime rate —0.142 0.028 0.096 0.065




Ml 1.74 3.99 2.96 3.85
M2 4.79 7.02 5.33 3.83
3.33 M
5.55 M
Unemployment ratet 5.46 5.76 4.08 3.29 4.73 M
Net exports as percent of GNP 0.36 0.20 0.45 0.22 0.30 0
a. The dates of the cyclical stages are shown in Table I-i.
b. Qdata available on a quarterly basis; M = data available on a monthly basis. Data avaUable from source
on'y on a quarterly basis (Q)were interpolated by a smoothing procedure so that they could be used on a
monthly basis for discriminant analysis.
c. Percent change; seasonally adjusted at an annual rate.
d. Percent change.
e. Change per month.
f. Seasonally adjusted at an annual rate.
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Recession Recovery Demand-Pull Stagflation
1973 Oct. 0.470* 0.028 0.442 0.060
Nov. 0.540* 0.004 0.441 0.015
Dec. 0.687* 0.003 0.310 0.000
1974 Jan. 0.496 0.000 0.504* 0.000
Feb. 0.991 * 0.000 0.009 0.000
Mar. 0.000 0.000 0.998* 0.002
Apr. 0.000 0.000 1.000* 0.000
May 0.000 0.000 1.000* 0.000
Jun. 0.026 0.011 0.963* 0.000
Jul. 0.001 0.001 0.998* 0.000
Aug. 0.651* 0.001 0.348 0.000
Sep. 1 .000* 0.000 0.000
Oct. 1.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000
Nov. 1 .000* 0.000 0.000 0.000
Dec. 1.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000
1975 Jan. 1.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000
Feb. 1 .000* 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mar. 0.972* 0.028 0.000 0.000
* Most probable group.
cyclical phase, in the discriminant analysis) are
shown in Table 1-3.
Several aspects of these results are quite in-
teresting. First, and most pronounced, the dis-
criminant analysis seems to waver between
identifying late 1973 and early 1974 as recession
and demand-pull. The discriminant extrapolä-
tions suggest that November and December
1973, as well as January and February 1974 are
periods of recession. The analytical specifica-
tion then swings back to demand-pull, lasting at
least until mid-summer. Explanations for this
ambivalence are not too difficult to identify. The
identification of late 1973 and early 1974 as
recession corresponds to the Arab oil embargo
and its impact on the U.S. economy. The re-
emergence of demand-pull in March 1974 re-
flects the end of that embargo and the impend-
ing removal of price and wage controls on the
U.S. economy, formally ended in April. Obvi-
ously, uncertainty over whether the economy
was really in demand-pull or recession in late
1973 and early 1974 creates some difficulties in
dating when the current U.S. recession may
have begun.
Another striking aspect of these projections
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into late 1973 and 1974 is that the evidence
would tentatively suggest that stagflation was
skipped in this most recent cyclical round. At
most, one could argue that there was perhaps a
touch of stagflation in October 1973, and this
would seem meaningful onlyif one adopted
November 1973 as the starting date for the
recession. In short, the U.S. economy apparently
moved almost directly from demand-pull into
recession either in November 1973 or August
1974.
The virtual absence of any identifiable stag-
flation in late 1973 and 1974 conflicts with an
oft-expressed view that the U.S. economy during
1974 was in a classic stagflation. The dis-
criminant analysis indicates that this was cer-
tainly not the case by postwar precedents.
Earlier stagflations have been periods char-
acterized, as the statistics in Table 1-2 indicate,
by somewhat slow, but not negative rates of
growth in total output and real GNP. The 1974
experience, by contrast, was one of quite dra-
matic declines in real GNP combined with sharp
price inflation. This mix has led some observers
to suggest that a new hybrid or terminology is
needed to describe the 1974 experience, suchas "slumpflation" or "inflationary recession."
The situation would not, moreover, be signifi-
cantly clarifiedif more traditional methods of
defining the cycle were used instead of the dis-
criminant analyses. In fact, considerable dis-
agreement exists among traditional cycle ana-
lystsin the United States about whether the
starting date of the current U.S. recession should
be placed at November 1973 or August 1974.
Inshort, the ambivalence so evident inthe
discriminant analyses is also to be found in the
conventional analyses—a hardly surprising fact
in that the same underlying source data are
used in both.
Charting,for example,isa time-honored
method of analyzing cyclical data. Thus, those
arguing for an August 1974 date as the begin-
fling of the current U.S. recession could use
diagrams such as those shown in Figure I-i to
suggest that an August 1974 starting date charts
better against the historical evidence on earlier
recessions than a November 1973 beginning.
From the charts in Figure I-i,it does seem on
balance that this may be so (though the answer
depends to some extent on exactly how one
"eyes" the data). In rebuttal, those favoring the
November 1973 starting date would argue that
a similarity of charting patterns is not so im-
portant as ascertaining the date when economic
activity in general more or less reached peaks,
regardless of causal factors or reasons; what
is deemed significant by these analysts is that
November 1973 is the date of so many cycle
peaks.Inflation,moreover, may account for
some of the divergences in tracking patterns:
the revised leading indicators, based mainly on
deflated data, track the historical experience
rather well with November as the starting date.
The complications inherent in doing an im-
mediate or hasty diagnosis by conventional
means can also be seen by looking at the data in
Table 1-4. The National Bureau's standard tests
TABLE 1-4
The 1 973—i 974 Business Cycle Experience as Seen at Various Times









Duration in months of decline in
GNP current $
C C C C
GNPconstant$ 3 6 9 9
Industrial production 4 4 4 12





Industrial production —2.4 —2.4 —2.4 —4.3
Nonfarm em p1. —0.2 —0.2 —0.2 —0.6
. Unemployment rate
Maximum 5.2 5.2 6.0 7.1
Increase +0.6 +0.6 +1.4 +2.5
Diffusion (percent)
Nonfarm industries:
maximum percentage with declining employmentb 52 52 52 60
. Jan. '74 Jan. '74 Jan. '74 Nov. '74
a. Percentage change from the peak month or quarter in the series to the trough month or quarter, over the
intervals shown in column headings. For the unemployment rate, the maximum figure is the highest for any
month during the contraction and the increases are from the lowest month to the highest in percentage points.
b. Based on changes in employment over six-month spans in thirty nonagricultural industries, centered on
the fourth month of the span.
C. No decline.
d. As of the third quarterof 1974.
5for the existence of a recession are embodied
in the so-called three D's: duration, depth, and
diffusion. In Table 1-4 some conventional mea-
sures of these three D's are shown as they might
have been seen at various times during 1974
and early 1975. Actually, the numbers in this
table have been "purified" because allthe
numbers are reported as if corrections in the
series available today were also available on
the dates shown in the column headings; that is,
the analysis was not further obfuscated by in-
corporating preliminary figures that were later
corrected.
Even without this complication, the figures
are hardly unambiguous guides to the 1974
experience. They again show, as in the dis-
criminant analysis, that the economy, after mov-
ing downward for four months after November
1973, then stabilized and moved sideways for
some while. This is particularly true of industrial
production and unemployment. The analysis is
also again complicated by continuing inflation.
It took until the first quarter 1975 for the current
dollar GNP figures to turn down. Nevertheless,
very substantial weaknesses in the economy are
also evident beginning as early as November
1973 and persisting throughout 1974. Thus,
even if the economy is not deemed to be in re-
cession beginninginNovember 1973,itis
clearly and continuously in a rather weakened
Figure I-i
Charts of Recent Times Series Behavior
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SOURCE: Quarterly Business Conditions Analysis, Irwin L. Kellner, Vice President and Economist, Manu-
facturers Hanover Trust Company (March 1975), pages 2 and 4.
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INDEX: Peak month = 100state after that date. After August the weak-
nesses onLy become more evident, more pro-
nounced, and more diffused.
Obviously, these findings are not encouraging
when one considers the potential usefulness of
taxonomic exercises for prompt and timely
identification of the "cyclical pathology" for
policy purposes. Specifically, both conventional
visual techniques for doing cyclical classifica-
tions and our discriminant analyses are re-
markably ambivalent about both the character
and the timing of recession's onset in the United
States during late 1973 and 1974. Both ap-
proaches can be used to build a case for either
November 1973 or August 1974 as the starting
date of the current U.S. recession. Accordingly,
a simple dichotomous classification of current
experience as being either a recession or not
a recession would not seem too promising for
establishing meaningful policy guidelines, at
least if the current recession experience is not
too atypical.
Classification is, of course, simply a reflection
of the current status of many different series
and variables that one might expect those mak-
ing policy decisions to scrutinize. Given the
ambiguities of translating these data into a tax-
onomy, the policymaker would seem well ad-
vised to go back to the primary sources instead
of relying on any secondary classification de-
rived from these underlying data. The moral is
surely obvious; an aggregate label of the econ-
omy as being in recession or not in recession
really does not convey all that much information.
The policymaker, with a variety of different
policy options at his disposal, must go beneath
simple dichotomous labels to determine a sen-
sible selection from these options.
Mechanization or minimization of the "human
factor"in the cyclical classification process
seemingly does little to alter this conclusion.
Specifically, our mechanized, or computerized
discriminant analysis yields much the same, and
conflicting, signals as do more conventional
analyses. To some extent, of course, one might
consider that a triumph for the computer. Given
the same information as the human analyst, it
ends up with the same uncertainties and va-
garies! In the present state of the art, therefore,
no substitute seems available for intensive, de-
tailed, and perhaps highly subjective and per-
sonalized, scrutiny of the underlying data by
those who must make private or public policy
assessments. then, the major contribu-
tion that cyclical taxonomy will make will be to
contribute to our historical understanding of
cyclical phenomena in market economies. That,
of course, is not necessarily a trivial contribu-
tion, but it is not the same as saying that cyclical
taxonomies are important tools for immediate
policy decisions as well.
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